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concerns have been discussed and debated by law makers 
and ethical bodies such as the Nuffield Council of Bioethics 
in the UK or the Danish Ethical Council [Det Etiske Råd] 
in Denmark. These organisations attempt to make sense of 
the ethical dilemmas that are prominent in this field more 
generally: namely, what it is acceptable to do in the name 
of assisting conception of children? This includes ques-
tions such as how much information should be available to 
offspring about donors, whether or not donors should be 
anonymous, if or how much donors should be paid, and what 
level of selection is permissible when undertaking donor 
insemination or IVF. I do not aim to give an answer to these 
different ethical questions, but rather to illuminate the ways 
in which the sperm donors in this sample are considering 
them in their day to day personal experiences of donating. 
As Erica Haimes (2002: 85) argues, empirical investigation 
can be used to ‘expand our repertoire of what counts as an 
ethical’ question by alerting us to the possibility of multiple 
perspectives on ethics’. I hope to provide a deeper under-
standing of donors’ perspectives on these issues.
In this paper, I examine the ways in which the sperm 
donors I interviewed discuss the ethical aspects of their 
donation, and in particular the uses to which their dona-
tion might be put. I consider how donors feel about which 
and how much information is available about them in online 
catalogues, and about the recipients’ ability to select donors 
based on this information. I will argue that donors are con-
sidering these ethical issues, but that having personal reser-
vations about the ethics of what they were doing, in terms of 
the narrow context of the effects on their potential offspring 
and/or in broader societal terms, was not necessarily a rea-
son for these men to decide against becoming a donor or to 
stop donating once they had started.
Abstract There has been a great deal of discussion about 
the ethical implications of donating sperm and of the ways 
in which donated tissue is presented, selected, and sold for 
use in assisted reproduction. Debates have emerged within 
the academic sphere, from donor offspring and recipients, 
and in broader popular culture, including questions about the 
commodification of human tissue and the eugenic potential 
of selecting donors from particular demographic categories. 
However, the voices of donors themselves on this subject 
have been largely silent. This paper draws on data from qual-
itative interviews with men who donated at a major Danish 
sperm bank between 2012 and 2013. It argues that many 
of them are indeed thinking through these complex issues. 
Donors’ approaches to ethical issues fell into two broad 
‘types’: a pragmatic, individualistic approach which focused 
on more immediate personal consequences, and an ethically-
driven approach in which donors considered the impact of 
donation on offspring and on a wider societal level.
Keywords Sperm donation · Selective reproduction · 
Denmark · Personal ethics
Introduction
In recent years, there has been a great deal of academic and 
non-academic attention paid to ethical concerns about the 
ways in which donor sperm is obtained and used. These 
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Sale, selection, and ethical acceptability
Dickenson (2007: 1) writes that ‘it is widely feared that we 
no longer possess a property in our own bodies.’ The ques-
tion of ownership has been raised many times in relation to 
human tissues. Traditionally, English law has assumed that 
tissue that has been removed from a living body is ‘res nul-
lius’, or belonging to no-one (Quigley 2012). However, many 
people consider themselves to have a claim on body parts, 
both from their own bodies and from their families’. Human 
gametes have only been marketable in their own right for 
a relatively short time; they were much more difficult to 
market before the development of technologies that give 
clinics the ability to isolate specific body parts and tissues 
for long-term storage and transport. While the European Tis-
sue Directive requires donation be founded on principles of 
altruism on the part of donors (Council Directive 2004/23/
EC 2004), this has not prevented cryobanking from becom-
ing a profitable business.
Resnik (1998) posits that, if we accept a divide between 
personhood and body, it might be possible to commodify the 
body without treating a person as a commodity; nothing of 
one’s personhood is lost by cutting hair, or donating blood. 
Semen may also fall under this category as men’s bodies 
constantly replenish the supply, unlike egg donation where 
each woman’s body has a finite amount of eggs. However, 
Resnik also suggests that selling gametes may be considered 
closer to selling a person, since gametes can form a person. 
This tension between the ease of obtaining of semen and 
the potential for it to form human life is central to issues 
around commodification of donor sperm. Holland (2001: 
264–5) argues that many people feel a sense of unease at 
the thought of the ‘billion dollar private-sector industries’ 
that are based on gametes and other bodily tissues, because 
they have ‘have an intimate connection to personhood’. 
“Contested commodities” have multiple and contradictory 
meanings: ‘internally, we might feel ourselves committed to 
the notion that the human body is priceless, even as we can 
wonder what price we might be able to get for the donation 
of our sperm or eggs’ (ibid.: 275). She sees ‘incomplete 
commodification’ as the answer to the ethical problems of 
commodifying human tissue, as it allows commodification 
with regulation. Similarly, Waldby and Mitchell (2006: 137) 
argue that tissue donation is an example of the entwinement 
of gift and commodity, where a ‘pure form of either [is] 
impossible’.
At the sperm bank I visited, the processed and stored 
straws of semen in the freezers are advertised for sale via 
online catalogues. The same basic information (race/eth-
nicity, eye colour, hair colour, height, weight, and occupa-
tion) was provided about every donor regardless of type. 
However, donors could also choose to provide an ‘extended 
profile’, which was created from a mixture of information 
that the sperm bank staff record about the donor (including 
their personal impressions of him) and information that the 
donor himself provides in the form of a questionnaire. This 
questionnaire included more in-depth information on the 
donor’s appearance (such as build, hair texture, and facial 
shape), family history and health information, and a num-
ber of questions about the donor’s personality, hobbies, and 
experiences. It also included a handwritten message to future 
offspring; such messages usually contained brief notes about 
why they had chosen to become a donor. Donors received 
a larger payment in exchange for submitting one of these 
extended profiles for display on the website, and recipients 
paid a surcharge to purchase from donors with extended 
profiles.
These catalogues are open for the public to browse and 
all of the information that the donor has allowed to be 
made available can therefore be viewed before a purchase 
is made. Potential recipient parents can then buy straws of 
sperm directly from the sperm bank, according to whichever 
criteria they prefer to use to select a specific donor. These 
criteria could be physical appearance, particularly similar-
ity in looks to the recipient parent(s) in order to potentially 
create family resemblance for bonding purposes or to facili-
tate non-disclosure of a child’s donor-conceived status; 
questionnaire responses and donor personality indicators, 
which allow recipients to pick the donor they think is most 
‘suitable’; or any combination of factors based around the 
information available. The sale of sperm, particularly via the 
internet, and the potential for recipients to select particular 
donors has drawn a great deal of media scrutiny, especially 
with regard to the types of men who are recruited as donors 
and to non-Danish women travelling to Denmark to obtain 
Danish sperm (Adrian 2010).
Donor sperm is not an entirely value-neutral product. A 
number of authors have previously addressed the question of 
what it is that sperm banks are selling beyond merely selling 
sperm: in particular, they are selling an idealised masculin-
ity and a particular kind of safe sperm (Moore and Schmidt 
1999; Daniels and Golden 2004; Almeling 2007; Kroløkke 
2009). Sperm banks have in place a rigorous selection pro-
cess for donors that encompasses both desirable (or saleable) 
social and physical traits, and a lack of ‘risky’ behaviour 
in order to reduce the chances for sperm to carry disease. 
Therefore, donor sperm is not sold simply as sperm, but 
rather it is tied closely to the details of the men who provided 
it. That is to say, buyers are not only buying donor sperm, 
they are buying donor sperm from a specific donor: sperm 
that is considered to be imbued with specific qualities based 
on him, or an idealised version of him. What is unclear from 
this literature is what donors themselves make of this kind 
of selective reproductive potential.
This paper draws on data from interviews with donors at 
a major Danish sperm bank between 2012 and 2013. The 
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Danish context is specifically interesting as a case study 
for research into sperm donors because of its position as an 
international hub for donor sperm. A number of UK sperm 
banks and fertility clinics import Danish sperm due to short-
ages of sperm from British donors, and both the Danish and 
British media have been steadily highlighting stories about 
British people (and other foreigners) travelling to Denmark 
in order to undergo donor insemination for over a decade. 
Unlike the UK, where identity-release donation (i.e. donors 
are required to be open to contact from their offspring when 
they reach the age of eighteen) is mandatory, Danish donors 
are able to choose whether or not they wish to donate anony-
mously or not. This means that recipients who order sperm 
through the mail for self-insemination without the interven-
tion of a clinic are able to bypass UK laws that forbid the 
collection and use of anonymous donor sperm.
Method
This study employed qualitative methods to investigate Dan-
ish donors’ experiences of being a sperm donor. The main 
body of data collection encompassed in-depth semi-struc-
tured interviews (see “Appendix”) with donors at several 
branches of a major Danish sperm bank. The majority (n = 9) 
of the interviews were carried out face to face, although 
for privacy and practical reasons, three donors opted to be 
interviewed via Skype and one via email. The interviews 
were transcribed as text and thematically analysed with the 
aid of QSR NVivo 10. Interviews were carried out by a soci-
ologist with a MA in Social Research and informed a PhD 
study. The research was conducted in accordance with the 
ethical standards of the University of Edinburgh. Informed 
consent was obtained from all individual participants. Par-
ticipants are referred to throughout by a pseudonym to pre-
serve confidentiality.
Participants were recruited initially by means of infor-
mation leaflets placed in the reception area of the sperm 
bank, and later via direct email mediated by the sperm bank 
manager when the initial recruitment method yielded few 
responses. Out of the 110 donors contacted, a total of 13 
donors participated in the study (see Table 1); no informa-
tion was available on non-respondents. There are a num-
ber of possible reasons for the difficulty faced in recruiting. 
Firstly, the nature of sperm donation as a practice, par-
ticularly taking into account the anonymous donors in the 
sample, may mean men are reluctant to speak about it for 
fear that they may be ‘outed’ as a donor. Secondly, sperm 
donation involves a sexual act and is therefore a topic that 
donors may have felt uncomfortable discussing. It is also 
possible that this discomfort may have been exacerbated 
with a female interviewer, though previous research has 
suggested this is not necessarily the case (e.g. Grenz 2010). 
Thirdly, conducting interviews in English may have limited 
the sample pool, and also potentially limited its demograph-
ics: we might posit that young, middle-class and/or highly 
educated Danes would be more likely to meet this criteria. 
However, the demographics of the eventual sample do not 
differ broadly from the demographic of the donor base at the 
time of the fieldwork.
Information for sale
Ten out of thirteen donors had opted for the extended profile. 
There was not necessarily a relationship between anonymity 
and choosing not to provide the extended profile; a mixture 
of both anonymous and identity-release donors had provided 
extended profiles and had opted out (see Table 2). Donors 
who had completed an extended profile generally cited 
either financial reasons (since providing this profile gave 
an increase of 10% to their eventual payment), or empathy 
with the potential recipients or offspring as their reasons, or 
both. For Lars, an anonymous donor whose motivation for 
donating was that he needed money, the additional payment 
was the main factor—he later said that he would not have 
chosen the extended option otherwise.
Interviewer  Why did you choose [to have an extended 
profile]?
Lars  Because you got an extra one thousand kroners 
for an extended profile! [both laugh] (...) As 
long as I’m doing it, and as long as I have an 
extended profile, I might as well do as much 
Table 1  Participant 
characteristics Age
 Median 26.5
Nationality
 Danish 12
 Non-Danish 1
Ethnicity
 White 11
 Non-white 2
Occupation
 Student 8
 Military 2
 Other profession 3
Marital status
 Married 4
 In a relationship 5
 No relationship 4
Children
 Yes 4
 No 9
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as I can for the person to make-if of course 
they are looking at all this information—they 
can make an informed decision as far as pos-
sible, given that I am anonymous. Because if 
it was me, I would like to know as much as 
possible about the biological father, to know 
how my kid might turn out to be [laughs] on 
some level.
However, having chosen to provide this information, he 
could empathise with the potential recipients’ desire for it. 
Giving recipients enough information to make an ‘informed 
decision’ was also discussed by Andreas, an identity release 
donor:
Andreas  I believe they know more about me than some-
body who has a child with their own husband 
[laughs] obviously, because I haven’t filled out a 
questionnaire for my wife. So she doesn’t know 
everything that’s in the questionnaire, but it’s sort 
of come in dribs and drabs as she’s known me, 
you know, so in a sense it’s a very informed deci-
sion these people are making. Because it is very, 
sort of, all round and goes around all kinds of 
aspects of who I am.
In contrast to Lars, Andreas viewed himself as ‘purely 
altruistic’; the payment he received from donation was an 
additional bonus to his main goal of helping people to con-
ceive, as he decided to become a donor after experiencing 
infertility treatment.
Donors felt that the personal information they provided 
would be useful to recipients not only in selecting physical 
donor traits that they hoped would be passed on to their 
offspring, but also in providing confidence that the donor 
was someone they could identify with, particularly for 
anonymous donors whom they could never meet in person. 
Georg, for example, felt the extended profile and informa-
tion about personality would be an important factor in his 
decision making if he were a recipient:
Georg  I think [wanting to choose donors] is a natural 
thing. If it was my family, so I couldn’t deliver 
sperm and would have to, to get a sperm donor, I 
would be very interested in getting the right one, 
or somebody that, that I could identify with as a 
father. Also more than just what skin colour and, 
er, these eye colours and stuff. I would be interested 
in, like, is it somebody who also is interested in 
science and all these things. (…) But then I guess 
that differs from person to person, some people will 
be more into the, er, how does this person feel and 
behave, and I would probably be more interested in 
what interests does this person have, and do they 
match mine. I think it’s a natural thing.
Some identity release donors had chosen to provide the 
extended profile because they wanted to offer as much infor-
mation to their future offspring as possible, even before age 
of 18:
Interviewer  Do you have an extended profile as well?
Kasper  Oh yes, extended and non-anonymous, 
because I think, er, looking into the perspec-
tive of the child, erm... it must be quite frus-
trating not to know where your genes stem 
from. Not that I ever would have a father-son 
or father-daughter connection with this child. 
But just to know where your genes stem from, 
I think that would be quite important to me, if 
I was this child.
It was less common for donors to talk about providing 
information for offspring than for recipients, perhaps in part 
because the majority of the donors were anonymous and did 
not intend to ever meet their offspring.
Control over information
Two donors (Christian and Bent) had opted out of extended 
profiles over concerns around identifiable information being 
shared online. Bent described feeling uncomfortable with 
strangers knowing too much about him:
Bent  I honestly don’t remember what people can find 
out about me. It’s probably my hair colour, that my 
Table 2  Donation characteristics
Donor anonymity
 Anonymous, extended profile 5
 Anonymous, no extended profile 3
 Identity release, extended profile 5
Length of donation
 <6 months 1
 6 months–3 years 11
 >3 years 1
Active donor
 Yes 10
 No 3
Other donation
 Blood 1
 Blood and organs 4
 None 8
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eyes are blue, my build, er, my profession. But that 
doesn’t really tell you anything. You get these, stories 
from America where they can see a picture and they 
know—they can almost contact your parents if they 
wanted to, to ask whether you were an easy child or 
not! And (…) that would be a bit too putting myself 
out there, slightly Big Brother-like without really 
being it.
Bent’s account suggests he feels surveilled by recipients 
(and potentially by others, as the information in the cata-
logues was openly available) who seem to want to know too 
much, in contrast to donors such as Andreas who felt it was 
necessary for an ‘informed decision’. Other donors also had 
concerns about surveillance; Henrik, though he did have an 
extended profile, feared donor offspring could use the data 
available online to track him down:
Henrik  Even though I am anonymous [I was concerned] 
that some of them could end up finding me. I’ve 
heard of some cases where they get together and 
they have the number of the donor. And they can 
get together and actually find each other, so all the 
siblings can find each other. And I think there was 
a case where they started searching on the profile, 
all the data in it, and found the guy. That has been 
some concern of mine.
This fear of losing control over whether or not they 
wanted to meet their potential offspring in the future was 
common across the sample. Several donors described recent 
Danish television programmes following donor offspring 
searching for their biological fathers, and this visibility may 
well have contributed to these worries about the amount 
of available information; potential hordes of unanticipated 
children ‘knocking at the door’ at an unspecified future time 
were described by Bent and several of the other donors. This 
fear seemed to stem from the potential to be unexpectedly 
asked to assume responsibility for the offspring, as well as 
from their potential to disrupt donors’ family life (Wheatley 
2017).
Ethics of payment
We have seen that payment was an important factor in choos-
ing an extended profile. For some donors, payment was the 
sole motivating factor for their donation:
Christian  The reality is that 99% of donors are students 
that need money and don’t care about what hap-
pens to their sperm. If donors and parents want 
to connect of course they should be able to. But 
this is a well paid job for most people, and noth-
ing else
Indeed, some donors had experimented with abstinence 
periods and other types of ‘body work’ (such as avoid-
ing alcohol) to help maximise the payment they received, 
since the sperm bank paid according to quality. Unhappy 
with this system, Lars had considered switching his labour 
to a different sperm bank which offered payment at a flat 
rate:
Lars  Even though on the sites they say they don’t 
pay for the sperm, they pay for the inconven-
ience it is for a person to come here, they still 
pay you according to the amount and quality. 
So yeah, it’s bogus. [laughs] Because incon-
venience is the same for all of us, no mat-
ter what the quality is. But the higher quality 
and the larger the amount, the more you will 
get paid, and as such, it is of interest to know 
whether you got 150 kroners or 500, because 
the margin is quite large. Er, the difference, 
yeah, in the lowest and highest.
Interviewer  Have you ever had a batch that completely 
failed?
Lars  Er, yes that happens, sometimes. Erm... that’s 
just too bad. And again, that’s the bogus part 
of the saying, of the part where they’re say-
ing “We pay you for the inconvenience”. Yes, 
you—the batch failed, or not the batch but the 
donation failed, and that gives me zero kro-
ners, but the inconvenience was still the same 
as the one that gave me 500.
Here, Lars calls into question what, exactly, is being 
paid for. In the UK, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
(2011) suggests dividing ‘recompense’ into ‘reimburse-
ment’ of direct financial loss and ‘compensation’ for 
‘discomfort’ and other non-financial losses, which Lars’s 
account suggests are not clearly conceptualised for donors.
For others, there were ethical implications in how much 
payment donors received and how sale prices were calcu-
lated. Georg, for example, had concerns about the final 
price of sperm being too high for all recipients to be able 
to access it:
Georg  I’m thinking that the main price on all that are this 
process like freezing, keeping it, medical stuff and 
that the actual payments to us donors is a minor 
thing. And as long as it is like that, then it’s justifi-
able that we get, these, like, yeah, er... this, what I 
would think would be a lot of money.
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Jonas was in favour of lowering payments, arguing that 
a level of payment that was too high could induce men 
to donate who had not fully thought through the ethical 
implications:
Jonas  [I donate] absolutely because of the money. Abso-
lutely. [But] I would never do it if I couldn’t accept 
it ethically, if I only saw it as a job I might believe 
that it was kind of weird. But it’s because I’m fully, 
I think, I believe myself that I fully understand the 
consequences of what I’m doing and that’s why I 
don’t mind doing it.
He drew on a narrative of donor responsibility toward 
their offspring to inform his definition of an ‘ethical’ donor. 
This narrative is often used by donor-conceived activists to 
justify their calls for openness; some donor offspring report 
feelings of abandonment or of ‘genetic discontinuity’, for 
example, upon finding out that they were donor-conceived 
(Turner and Coyle 2000). He did not, however, advocate the 
full removal of payment for donation; indeed, no donors in 
the sample did.
Limitations on donor matching
Selecting based on matching particular physical traits to pro-
duce a family resemblance was accepted by the majority of 
the donors. Some donors, however, were uncomfortable with 
this selection being made at the level of the individual donor. 
Jonas had opted out of the extended profile for this reason. 
He instead suggested that a lottery might be appropriate, 
matching donors to recipients at random within the bounds 
of narrow selection criteria:
Interviewer  You mentioned the online profiles and the abil-
ity for parents to pick donor characteristics—
Jonas  I don’t like that. I hate that! [laughs]
Interviewer  So how would you rather it was set up?
Jonas  Anonymously! I think that it’s good that there 
might be a few options to pick off. Something 
like skin colour and ethnicity, something like 
that.
Interviewer  Why ethnicity?
Jonas  Only because it can be, it’s not all people that 
are capable of getting a little black child, for 
example. If a Southern American got a black 
child, it would be kind of weird for them I 
think. It’s not everyone who’s capable of tak-
ing that responsibility for something which is 
basically the same but in some ways culturally 
are different, right? Which we look at differ-
ently in our culture. But basically I think it 
should be just random, because—well yeah, 
we’re, it’s just children, right? [laughs]
With this comment, Jonas seems to take the position 
that ‘children are children’ and recipients should be able to 
accept a donor for their offspring at random, echoing ideas 
about the parental imperative to unconditional love (San-
del 2007). However, he also makes allowances for issues of 
resemblance with regard to ethnicity. An in-depth analysis of 
ethnicity in sperm banking is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but the ways in which these categories have been constructed 
in sperm donation more broadly have been previously docu-
mented by others (see e.g. Nordqvist 2012; Hudson 2015). 
Skin colour is often treated as the most important character-
istic to ensure resemblance in donor matching, and it seems 
therefore unsurprising that donors consider it of utmost 
importance as well. Parallels could also be drawn between 
Jonas’s references to cultural difference and narratives of 
transracial adoption (e.g. Lee 2003).
Although Jonas was the only donor to opt out of the 
extended profile for reasons of selection, other donors, who 
had agreed to an extended profile for the extra money, had 
begun to question their decision. Mikael described his pre-
ferred system which would, like Jonas’s, match on broad 
characteristics of appearance in order to create family 
resemblance:
Mikael  I think it should be possible to continue the ele-
ment of chance, so that the donor they eventually 
receive sperm from will be of the same type as 
the husband. Well, maybe [laughs] they don’t want 
that type, but anyway (...) that same general type. 
So if they want someone that’s 5’10 with curly 
hair, then give them a donor that’s 5’10 with curly 
hair, end of story. And not... one out of twenty 
options in that, erm, in that range.
These suggestions to reduce the granularity of matches 
seem to at once relate back to concerns around anonymity 
and surveillance and also to fears about using donor infor-
mation to make very specific selections to ensure an off-
spring with certain desired traits.
Selecting for desired traits
There was a clear boundary of acceptability for donors 
between matching for resemblance and selecting for traits 
desired by the recipient parents. Donors such as Bent, for 
example, articulated a difference between the two:
Bent  I like blondes, my girlfriend’s a blonde, I chose 
her partly because of that. So, if we couldn’t have 
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a child, I would want a blonde child anyway, prob-
ably. Not just because I think it’s more attractive and 
I want attractive children, but also because people 
wouldn’t notice it as much if we had a blonde child 
as if we had a, erm, a brunette or something. So no, 
I... [sighs] all these ethical questions about choosing 
your child, it can get a bit too much. I don’t agree 
with—again, you hear these terrible stories from 
America where they can almost choose the length of 
the arms and anything and I wouldn’t want that.
Here, characteristics which would mark a child as a 
member of the family and avoid potentially difficult ques-
tions from outsiders, such as hair colour, are acceptable, 
whereas characteristics that are less likely to contribute 
to family resemblance, such as arm length, are not. This 
idea of ‘choosing your child’ was discussed negatively by 
several donors, reflecting wider debates about the ethics of 
creating ‘designer babies’, particularly as it relates to the 
ethics of selecting for disease- versus non-disease-related 
traits (Sterckx et al. 2013). Mikael, for example, explicitly 
illustrated a dichotomy between selection for health, which 
he argued was for the benefit of society, and selection for 
appearance:
Mikael  The thing is that selective breeding really isn’t 
something that humans should do. In my mind, if 
it ruined dogs, which it did, then it will probably 
ruin Homo Sapiens as well. (…) What annoys me 
about it is probably the fact that people might be 
choosing out of the wrong reasons. Some of the 
reasons that would make sense to me would be 
(pause) I think I was told, er, a while ago that, for 
some reason, Scandinavians, at least Swedes, Nor-
wegians and Danes, have a mutation on our T-cells 
that makes us slightly more immune to HIV.1 And 
if that, if that is actually true, then that would 
make sense, because it’s something that makes 
the human race better. On the other hand, when 
people start saying “yeah! we want Scandinavians 
because they’re tall, and blonde, and blue-eyed” 
then (…) I start to worry, because that’s the wrong 
way of looking at it.
The emphasis on tall, blonde and blue-eyed here seems 
to echo fears around eugenics and the value of particular 
sets of physical traits (Daniels and Golden 2004); there 
is a sense that the particular traits of Danish donors that 
might be desired by recipient parents are tied to social 
desirability and prejudice.
Mikael further argued that that the amount of informa-
tion available about donors was excessive in comparison 
with norms of partner selection:
Mikael  I don’t like the idea of people having too many 
things to choose from when choosing a donor. 
Because they might not choose from the same 
things when they choose a partner, and that’s the 
point really. I mean, when we meet somebody we 
don’t really know how they are, how it would be 
like to live with them. And that process takes a 
long time and [is] kind of short-circuited when you 
choose a sperm donor, because it’s basically just 
a catalogue you choose from. So that part kind of 
makes me uncomfortable.
He believed that it was wrong for recipients of donor 
sperm to choose based on an ‘ideal’ partner rather than 
the characteristics of their actual partner. In contrast, Isak 
argued that the selection potential of donor insemination 
reflected other forms of selective reproduction already 
available.
Isak  I don’t think it’s a good idea that you can like choose 
the eye colour of your children or the hair colour, but 
you know what, a lot of people get an abortion if the 
child has Down’s Syndrome, I mean... we are already 
in the process of selecting some children and throw-
ing out others. And... of course, I’m part of that selec-
tion process but then again, I think it’s more up to the 
society to discuss what is right and wrong, and I like 
the fact that parents have the opportunity to select as 
they would have in adoption settings. I mean, if they 
have a preference of a child from Ethiopia because of 
some cultural thing instead of a kid from Asia, I don’t 
know... erm... that’s the same kind of selection for me.
Isak drew on ideas about abortion and disability to argue 
that there is already selection taking place in society; the 
incidence of Down’s Syndrome in Denmark, for example, 
has been falling since a new pre-natal screening policy was 
introduced in 2004 (Ekelund et al. 2008). There is potential, 
then, for donors to be drawing on debates outside of the 
sphere of donor insemination in particular to inform their 
personal ethics around the topic as well as drawing on the 
donation debates themselves. Isak connects his place in the 
process of selective reproduction with ethics at the societal 
level.
Jonas emphasised that he would be willing to disclose 
personal details to his potential offspring but described 
selection for desirable traits as ‘problematic’:
1 The allele CCR5-delta32 has been shown to be responsible for cer-
tain types of HIV resistance, and is primarily found in Nordic popula-
tions (Lucotte 2001).
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Jonas  So what I would most prefer to be in would be 
the closed personal profile so you don’t know 
anything about me, but not anonymous, so the 
children would have the opportunity to look 
me up 1 day, if that’s what they wanted to do.
Interviewer  Why would you prefer it that way round?
Jonas  I think it’s very problematic, the trend that 
is going on right now (…) a lot of technol-
ogy is focusing on how to create babies with 
DNAs, like, I want a blonde baby, I want a 
darker, I want a smart baby because I only 
want the ones that have been to university, I 
want a beautiful child, and I don’t like that. I 
think that’s very problematic in many ways. 
But I still think that it’s important that—we’ve 
got to accept it’s not a natural thing, it’s not 
normal to give birth through a sperm donor.
It is clear, therefore, that not all donors who were in 
favour of reducing opportunities for selection were in favour 
of not collecting that information at all; rather, they believed 
that limitations should be put in place on who could access 
information and for what purpose.
Discussion
In becoming a sperm donor, the men in this study were 
obliged to make choices regarding openness and the provi-
sion of information: the decision to remain anonymous or 
to become an ‘identity release’ donor open to contact with 
offspring when they come of age; and, separately, the deci-
sion to complete an extended profile for the donor catalogue. 
Donors often drew on moral narratives when discussing their 
reasons for making particular choices, invoking ideas about 
selective reproduction in the process.
‘Matching’ donors’ physical characteristics to those of 
recipient parents is established practice in gamete donation, 
historically because maximising the resemblance between 
the child and the recipient father allows heterosexual couples 
to hide the stigma of male infertility (Daniels and Taylor 
1993). However, family resemblance also plays a role in the 
formation of kinship bonds by helping ‘locate’ the child in 
the family group (Hargreaves 2006: 273), including in the 
context of lesbian conception (Nordqvist 2010). In contrast, 
the ‘designer baby’, a child who through active selection or 
direct genetic modification is born with particular traits, has 
been the subject of a great deal of ethical controversy (see 
e.g. Fauser and Devroey 2011). Designer babies represent a 
combination of ‘biogenetic control, consumer demand, and 
parental desire’ (Franklin and Roberts 2006: 1), seeming to 
contravene norms that would position all children as ‘gifts 
or blessings’ (Sandel 2007). Opinion has often been split 
regarding the acceptability of selecting out disease-related 
traits and non-disease-related traits (Sterckx et al. 2013). 
The donors in the sample also differed on the extent to which 
they considered selection wrong. While most donors were 
in favour of matching for family resemblance, some were 
against any characteristics other than ethnicity being used 
while others were in favour of other markers of physical 
resemblance such as hair colour. Others felt that physical 
characteristics were ‘trivial’ but suggested that selecting 
for desirable health-based traits, such as HIV resistance, 
was acceptable for reasons of public health. Several donors 
argued that selecting for desirable characteristics was mor-
ally wrong—but although many donors spoke at length 
about their ethical concerns regarding selection, these ques-
tions and ethical misapprehensions were not enough to pre-
vent them from donating.
Many of the donor narratives involve the ‘naturalisa-
tion’ of selection and technological mediation in some way. 
Naturalisation is defined by Cussins (1998) in her study of 
infertility clinics as
the rendering of states of affairs and facts in a scientific 
or biological idiom, and the means by which certain 
uncertainties, questionings, and contingencies are ren-
dered unproblematic, “natural”, or self-evident.
This second idea is evident in accounts of donation from 
participants. Donors who are questioning the ethics of issues 
such as selection in assisted reproduction can draw on pre-
existing narratives of ethics in other activities that are con-
sidered to be ‘natural’, such as mate selection, or already 
‘naturalised’, in the case of adoption. The question of selec-
tion and the comparison of ‘mate choice’ with sperm dona-
tion has been made in the past by authors who suggest that 
women value the same kind of physical appearance and per-
sonal characteristics in both their selection of sperm donors 
and of long-term romantic partners (Scheib et al. 1997). This 
kind of naturalisation narrative allows the donors to render 
unproblematic the ethics of this particular facet of donation. 
On the other hand, as some donors argued, the amount of 
information available to potential donor sperm recipients 
was much greater than the amount of information available 
in a ‘natural’ mate selection situation. Therefore, donors can 
use or resist the ‘naturalisation’ of donation in order to sup-
port their personal ethics.
At the beginning of this paper I quoted Erica Haimes, 
who argues that it is possible for empirical research to give 
us multiple perspectives on ethics to help us to consider what 
an ‘ethical’ question might actually be. In the discussion that 
followed, I have explored the kinds of ethical questions that 
donors are thinking about and using to inform their decisions 
about whether and how to donate. I have focused broadly on 
questions about the availability of information and the poten-
tial for selective reproduction, though these were not the only 
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ethical issues that donors were considering: the questions of 
how much payment should be given for sperm donation, how 
many children each donor should be able to produce, and 
whether or not anonymous donation should be permitted 
were also discussed by donors. There is no single viewpoint 
on these questions across all of the donors in this sample, or 
across donors of a particular ‘type’ (e.g. anonymous donors). 
Rather, there seem to be two main approaches. The first is 
typified by a pragmatic, individualistic approach to issues 
of payment and selection in decision making as it relates 
to donation. Donors of this approach believed that donors 
should be paid and viewed donation as a job, perhaps invest-
ing time in achieving the most money. They had concerns 
about becoming identifiable but may have chosen to have 
an extended online profile due to the financial incentive. 
Their attitude towards selection was one of empathy with 
the recipient parents: they felt that they would want the same 
information if he was in the position of having to choose 
a sperm donor. The second approach might be considered 
ethically-driven. Donors of this approach made decisions 
based strongly on the (perceived) needs and desires of the 
potential donor offspring. They were in favour of donors 
being identity-release, but also wanted tighter restrictions 
on the information available to potential recipients prior to 
donation due to concerns about the morality of selective 
reproduction. They viewed donors who saw their donation 
as ‘just a job’ as irresponsible, but also placed responsibil-
ity for ethical decisions around selection on wider society.
While there were also donors who had not spent time 
contemplating their personal ethical conception of what 
they were doing, many of the donors had thought about and 
expressed opinions on issues such as selection, anonym-
ity, and payment. This is in contrast to popular images of 
sperm donors as indifferent to the context of their donation 
beyond the immediate monetary reward (Almeling 2011: 
143; Thomson 2008). The ethical questions that donors 
are considering are not necessarily the same ones that have 
been most important in the academic and media debates: 
all were content with the status quo of the choice between 
anonymous and identity-release donation, for example. The 
main ethical question was around the amount of personal 
information available to recipients, either as part of a set of 
wider concerns around the effects of selection, or because 
the donors were concerned for their own future well-being. 
Therefore, the ‘personal ethics’ that the donors have vary in 
scale: some donors are concerned about the effect of their 
actions on them and those close to them, some on the donor 
recipients, some on the donor offspring, and some on a soci-
etal level.
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- Just to get things started, could you tell me a lile bit about yourself?
- RECORD DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
- Could you tell me a bit about your story with regards to donaon?
- PROMPT FOR
- how long have you been donang? / when did you start donang?
- how oen do you donate?
- do you donate anonymously/identy-release?
- why?
- do you have an extended profile?
- why?
- do you donate anything else? e.g. blood/organs?
- Why did you decide to donate? 
FOLLOW UP: how did you hear about donaon as an opon?
- Are the reasons the same now as then?
- what could make you stop donang?
- Do you know what the Cryos “ideal type” is for new donors? 
FOLLOW UP: did you fit it? Feelings on that?
DONATION PROCESS
- Can you describe your experience of making donaons? 
PROMPT FOR 
- do you have a parcular roune?
- do you noce that donaon has any effect on you?
- how do you feel about coming to the sperm bank?
- did/do you have any concerns or worries about donaon?
- Do you know what happens aer you have donated?
PROMPT FOR?
- Do you know what your sperm molity is? 
- What are your feelings on that? 
- How do you feel when you get a bad result?
- How would you feel if you found out that your sperm had never been used?
RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHERS
- Do you know if there have been any successful pregnancies?
- Would you ever want contact with your donor offspring?
PROMPT FOR
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- why/why not?
- what sort of things would you want to know about them? (even if they say no 
contact)
- how do you imagine your future relaonship with your offspring?
- to what extent do you consider yourself a "father"?
- Do you talk to people about being a sperm donor?
PROMPT FOR 
- who/how?
- how does partner/family feel about it?
- how would you feel if partner’s permission was required?
-Do you ever think about the kinds of people who might use your sperm?
POST-DONATION
- How do you feel about the donor catalogues?
PROMPT FOR
- have you looked at your entry?
- do you have any thoughts on the way that donor informaon is presented?
- would you be an exclusive donor?
- why/why not?
- How do you feel about the money you get for donang?
PROMPT FOR
- do you use the money for anything specific?
- are you happy with the level of payment?
- would you connue to donate if you didn’t get paid?
- Are you aware of any debates about donaon?
PROMPT FOR
- Do you think that donors in Denmark should be allowed to choose whether to be 
anonymous? 
FOLLOW UP: why/why not?
- Do you know how many offspring donors are allowed to have?
FOLLOW UP: should they change that? Why?
- Did you hear about the recent NF1 scandal/law change? 
WRAP UP
- I’d like to finish off by asking whether there is anything else that you’d like to say about 
donaon/ families/anything else that we’ve talked about?
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